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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Michael Russo was found guilty of one count of rape, one 
count of first degree kidnapping, and one count of burglary. He received an aggregate 
sentence of fixed life. 
On appeal, Mr. Russo asserts two claims of error. First, he contends that the 
district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video discovered through a 
warrantless, non-consensual search of his phone. Second, he contends that the district 
court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 
concerning his deviant sexual interests. 
In response, the State argues that no error occurred. The present Reply Brief is 
necessary to explain why the State's arguments are without merit. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
Mr. Russo's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, need not be repeated in toto herein. 
However, because the State's Respondent's Brief is somewhat misleading, some 
factual clarifications are necessary. 
In its statements of facts, the State provides a graphic description of J.W.'s rape, 
all the while portraying Mr. Russo as her assailant. (Resp. Br., pp.1-2.) Under the 
State's version of the "facts," one is left with the abiding impression that it is somehow 
beyond cavil that Mr. Russo was J.W.'s rapist. (See Resp. Br., pp.1-2.) However, 
nothing could be further from the truth. While Mr. Russo readily concedes that J.W. was 
the victim of a horrible crime, and he is mindful of the jury's verdict in this case, he 
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contends that there is scant evidence that he was the actual perpetrator. First, J.W. did 
not identify Mr. Russo as her attacker-either in a photo lineup or by listening to an 
audio recording of his voice. (See 8/2/10 Tr., p.238, LsA-15; 8/3/10 Tr., p.551, L.21 -
p.553, L.16, p.57, L.22 - p.58, L.6, p.60, Ls.1-10.) While J.W.'s inability to identify 
Mr. Russo as her attacker in a photograph is not overly probative, given that the rapist 
wore a mask,1 her inability to identify Mr. Russo in an audio recording is highly 
probative, given that J.W.'s rapist spoke to her repeatedly during his commission of the 
attack. (See, e.g., 8/2/10 Tr., p.210, Ls.8-12, p.212, Ls.2-4, p.215, L.22 - p.216, L.6, 
p.219, Ls.2-4, p.220, Ls.1-5.) Second, despite the State's efforts, no forensic evidence 
linking Mr. Russo to the crime was ever located. (See Tr., p.417, L.1 - p.418, L.3, 
p.419, L.16 - p.420, L.3 (Rylene Nowlin, an Idaho State Police forensic scientist, 
testifying that DNA from saliva found on J.W.'s person, and from semen found on her 
floor, matched other men besides Mr. Russo, and that penile swabs of Mr. Russo and 
swabs of latex gloves found in Mr. Russo's possession did not evidence any contact 
with J.W.).) Third, the State's most crucial piece of evidence-the video of Mr. Russo 
having vaginal intercourse with an unidentified female found on his cell phone (see 
R., p.121 (prosecutor stating "[t]he video is the strongest piece of evidence that links the 
Defendant to the crime. Its exclusion most likely would result in the State dismissing 
criminal charges against the Defendant"); 11/30/10 Tr., p.94, LS.8-10 (district court 
1 It is, however, somewhat probative given that the assailant apparently knew J.W., as 
he told her during the rape that he had been waiting two years to rape her. (See 8/2/10 
Tr., p.219, Ls.2-4 (J.W. testifying that her attacker stated, "[t]his is for two-and-a-half 
years ago. You wouldn't give me the time of day"); 8/4/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.11-19 (Detective 
Weeks testifying that the rapist's statement suggested he was a prior acquaintance of 
J.W.).) 
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commenting at sentencing that "you [Mr. Russo] really failed by taking the [video], 
because, largely, without that, there wouldn't have been a conviction"))-is not 
particularly compelling because, although J.W. and her gynecologist both identified J.W. 
as the female in the video (see 8/2/10 Tr., p.226, Ls.5-19; 8/4/10 Tr., p.92, L.2 - p.94, 
L.10), the accuracy of their testimony is highly questionable. (Compare Exs. 4, 5 & 6 
(photos of J.W.'s pubic area, depicting an average-looking shaved female pubic area 
that is notable to the layman based on two c-section scars, a distinctive mole and, a 
tattoo on the side of the abdomen) and 8/4/10 Tr., p.86, L.14 - p.91, L.1 (J.W.'s 
gynecologist, Dr. Lisa Minge, describing J.W.'s pubic area as being notable insofar as 
J.W. lacks pubic hair, "has a markedly defined prepuce," or clitoral hood, has a 
distinctive permanent skin crease, has two C-section scars, has a mole off to the side of 
the scars, "has a significant tattoo on her lower abdomen," and has a belly button ring, 
and pointing these features out on Exhibits 4, 5, and 6), with Ex. 49 (cell phone video 
depicting a woman with a shaved pubic area and perhaps a c-section scar or a skin 
crease, but seeming to lack a navel piercing, a tattoo, and a distinctive mole).) Finally, 
although he was interrogated at some length by the police, Mr. Russo never made any 
admissions with regard to the rape of J.W. See Ex. 59.2 
Elsewhere in its Respondent's Brief, the State makes a number of other 
misleading statements of fact which bear correction or clarification. However, the 
clarification/correction of these statements are addressed infra, in conjunction with the 
specific arguments to which they pertain. 
2 Exhibit 59 is a redacted video of Mr. Russo's interrogation. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an 
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 




The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An 
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Russo contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress, under the 
Fourth Amendment, the fruits of the State's search of his person, and then his cell 
phone. In presenting this argument in his Appellant's Brief, he first explained why the 
warrant authorizing a search of his home and motorcycle did not allow the police to 
search him, or the phone found on his person, while he was outside of his residence 
(App. Br., pp.14-16); he then rebutted one of the arguments alluded to by the State 
below, i.e., that the search of the phone was permissible as part of a TerrY frisk for 
weapons (App. Br., pp.16-20); and, finally, he debunked the State's primary argument, 
which was ultimately adopted by the district court, that police discovery of the contents 
of his phone was inevitable such that the exclusionary rule should not be applied even if 
his Fourth Amendment rights were violated (App. Br., pp.20-23). 
In response, the State argues two of the three points discussed in Mr. Russo's 
Appellant's Brief, and it also presents a brand new argument, raised for the first time on 
appeal. The State argues first that, even though Mr. Russo was outside his residence 
when contacted by the police, the search of his person-and the phone found on his 
person-was nevertheless within the scope of the warrant authorizing a search of 
residence and his motorcycle. (Resp. Br., pp.8-10.) Second, the State argues for the 
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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first time on appeal that the search of Mr. Russo's person and, later, his phone, was a 
search incident to arrest. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) Finally, the State argues that, even if 
the search of Mr. Russo and his phone was violative of the Fourth Amendment, the 
exclusionary rule ought not to apply because the evidence on that phone would have 
inevitably been discovered through lawful means.4 (Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) 
For the reasons set forth in detail below, none of the State's arguments can 
salvage the district court's erroneous denial of Mr. Russo's suppression motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As the State does not dispute that the standard of review set forth in Mr. Russo's 
Appellant's Brief (p.13) is the applicable standard of review, no further discussion of the 
standard of review is required herein. 
C. The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
1. Under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), Even If Mr. Russo Was 
Properly Detained While Officers Obtained And Executed A Search 
Warrant For His Residence, He Could Not Be Searched Pursuant To That 
Warrant 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo acknowledged that he could be detained while 
officers executed a search warrant on his house, but argued that in Michigan v. 
4 Although the State presented an "inevitable discovery" argument below, the "inevitable 
discovery" argument presented on appeal is fundamentally different from that which was 
presented below. In the district court, the State argued that discovery of the cell phone 
video was "inevitable" because, were it not for the illegal search, the State would have 
procured (and, in fact, did procure) a second warrant which would have allowed officers 
to search Mr. Russo's phone. (R., p.119.) On appeal, the State takes a very different 
approach, arguing that, regardless of the illegal search of Mr. Russo's person and 
phone, he inevitably would have been arrested and searched incident to arrest. 
(Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) 
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Summers the United States Supreme Court made it clear that a suspect contacted 
outside the residence cannot be searched pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of 
the residence itself. (App. Br., pp.15-16 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 694).) 
The State responds by arguing that a search warrant authorizing a search of a 
residence also necessarily authorizes the search of all persons found outside, but 
apparently in close proximity to, the residence. (Resp. Br., pp.8-10.) This argument 
turns on a tortured reading of the applicable authorities. The State reasons that 
because one Idaho Court of Appeals opinion, State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 
2002), used the word "premises" broadly in describing the property surrounding the 
residence named in a search warrant, we cannot know what the United States Supreme 
Court meant when, in Summers, it ruled that a search warrant cannot be used to "justify 
the initial detention of [the defendant] outside the premises described in the warrant." 
(Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) The State's argument is meritless. 
In Pierce, the warrant authorized a search of what was apparently a rural 
property, as it specifically authorized searches of the home, barn, stables, and vehicles 
on that property. Pierce, 137 Idaho at 297. Thus, it made sense for the Court of 
Appeals to describe the property loosely as "the premises." In contrast, in Summers, 
the Supreme Court was obviously being more precise in describing "the premises" as 
the residence to be searched. There, the Court observed that the defendant was 
contacted on the outside front steps of his residence. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. 
Based on this fact, the Court concluded that the defendant was "outside the premises 
described in the warrant." Id. at 694. 
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In this case, we know that the search warrant particularly described Mr. Russo's 
residence and his motorcycle (see R, p.134), and that Mr. Russo was undoubtedly 
accosted by the police outside of his residence (see R, p.139). Accordingly, the search 
warrant in this case is analogous to that which was at issue in Summers and, just as in 
Summers, the defendant was initially detained "outside the premises described in the 
warrant." Summers, 452 U.S. at 695. Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in 
Summers, the seizure and subsequent search of the defendant cannot now be justified 
as being implicitly authorized under the search warrant for the premises. Id. 
2. Even If Mr. Russo Was Validly Detained, Under The Standards Set Forth 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), There Was No Basis To Search Him 
For Weapons And, Even If There Was, The Officers' Search Of 
Mr. Russo's Phone Far Exceeded What Was Permissible Under Terry 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo addressed an argument alluded to by the 
State below, explaining why his detention and search, and the search of his phone, 
were not permissible as "weapons frisk" under Terry v. Ohio. (App. Br., pp.16-20.) In 
its Respondent's Brief, the State fails to address this argument, apparently abandoning 
all attempts to justify the search in this case under Terry. Because the State has 
waived any argument under Terry, see State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996) ("A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking .... "); 
I.A.R 35(b)(6),5 no further discussion of this issue is warranted herein. 
5 Although Zichko dealt with an appellant's failure to provide authority or argument, it 
actually spoke in broader terms, couching its holding in terms of "a party" who fails to 
provide authority or argument. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, (emphasis added). This 
broader language makes sense, of course, since the holding of Zichko was based on 
the appellant's failure to comply with I.A.R 35, which requires not only that the 
appellant's brief "contain the contentions of the appellant ... , the reasons therefor, with 
citations to the authorities, citations and parts of the transcript and record relied upon," 
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3. The Search Of Mr. Russo's Person, And The Cell Phone Found On His 
Person, Cannot Be Justified As A Search Incident To Arrest 
Having abandoned the Terry exception to the warrant requirement, which was 
one the arguments apparently attempted to have been advanced below (see 
R., pp.111-14), the State now attempts to justify the search of Mr. Russo's person, and 
the cell phone found on his person, under a different exception to the warrant 
requirement-the search incident to arrest exception. Mr. Russo submits, however, that 
this new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is unavailing. 
Preliminarily, it is important to note that, especially in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment (because it is the State that bears the burden of proving that a given 
warrantless search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,290 (1995)), the State is not free to raise 
new arguments for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 
509, 515 n.4 (2010) (identifying the rule that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider 
issues not raised in the court below," and suggesting that that rule generally applies to 
the State when it is the respondent on appeal, just as it does to the defendant-
appellant); State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 81-82 (2000) (rejecting the State's attempt to 
argue for the first time on a appeal that the defendant lacked "standing" to challenge the 
search of his wife's purse); State v. Reimer, 127 Idaho 214,218-19 (1995) (rejecting the 
State's attempt to argue for the first time on appeal that the search of a mug was 
permissible under the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement). See also 
I.A.R. 35(a)(6), but also that the respondent's brief contain such things. I.A.R. 35(b)(6). 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has defaulted the State, as the respondent, when it has 
failed to comply with the requirements of I.A.R. 35(b)(6). See e.g., State v. Ruiz, 150 
Idaho 469,471 (2010) (declining to address the question of whether an error found was 
harmless because the State failed to present argument on this point). 
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Obenchain v. McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57 (2006) ("Appellate court review is 
'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented ... below.' 
Consequently, appellate courts will not consider new arguments raised for the first time 
on appeaL") (citations omitted). Cf United States v. Jones, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
954 (2012) (rejecting the government's attempt to argue for the first time in the Supreme 
Court that placing a tracking device on a vehicle was lawful because the officers 
possessed probable cause to believe that the defendant was "a leader in a large-scale 
cocaine distribution conspiracy"; finding that because this argument was not addressed 
below and, therefore, not addressed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, it was 
forfeited). 
To the extent, however, that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new 
argument, it should reject it. The State's argument is essentially as follows: (1) 
although the police had absolutely no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest (as 
they repeatedly described their detention of him as an "investigative detention," explicitly 
told him that he was not under arrest, and explained that they searched him as part of a 
weapons frisk), this Court should retrospectively characterize the encounter as an arrest 
and a search incident to arrest; (2) in characterizing this encounter as an arrest and a 
search incident to arrest, this Court should ignore the fact that Mr. Russo was arrested 
primarily because of the fruits of the supposed "search incident to arrest," not based on 
the evidence which caused the officers to seek a search warrant for Mr. Russo's home 
and motorcycle; (3) this Court should find that, if there is probable cause for issuance of 
a search warrant for a home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of 
that home; and (4) because Mr. Russo has not challenged on appeal the magistrate's 
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issuance of a search warrant, it is now "undisputed" that probable cause to search and, 
therefore, to arrest, existed. (Resp. Br., pp.10-12.) This entire argument is premised on 
the assertion that the United States Supreme Court has held that a search incident to 
arrest may "precede[ ] a formal arrest, so long as probable cause to arrest a suspect 
exists at the time of the search." (Resp. Br., p.11 (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 
98, 111 (1980).) 
The flaws in the State's argument are legion. First and foremost, the State's 
argument is premised upon a somewhat misleading representation of United States 
Supreme Court precedent. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court certainly held 
that a search incident to arrest may precede formal arrest where probable cause to 
arrest exists at the time of the search, Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111; however, the State 
fails to mention that this is true only "[w]here the formal arrest followed quickly on the 
heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person," id., and where the fruits of that 
search do not serve as "part of" the justification for the arrest, Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 
541, 543 (1990) (quoting Sib ron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968)); see also 
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 111 n.6. See State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351 (Ct. App. 
2008) ("So long as the search and arrest are substantially contemporaneous, and the 
fruits of the search are not required to establish probable cause for the arrest, the 
search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be incident to that arrest."). 
In this case, the officers had no intention of placing Mr. Russo under arrest 
initially; they only intended to detain him. It was only because the phone was 
discovered and searched, and potentially incriminating evidence was found on that 
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phone, that Mr. Russo was actually arrested. Detective Cain, one of the two officers 
who detained Mr. Russo, described the incident in her report as follows: 
Cpl. Weekes stated that if he stepped outside if his residence again, he 
needed to be detained . . .. Mike exited his residence . . .. I detained 
Mike with my handcuffs and told him he was being detained. He asked if 
he was being arrested ofr] detained. I told him it was called an 
investigatory detention at this time. I then searched Mike to make sure he 
didn't have anything sharp on him. He had a wallet in his right back 
pocket and a cell phone in his front right pocket. . .. I held onto Mike's 
wallet and cell phone until I turned them over to Detective King when he 
arrived on scene approximately 5 minutes after I detained him. 
(R., p.142 (emphasis added).) Detective King then searched the phone. (See 
R., p.104; 1/27/10 Tr., p.70, L.21 - p.71, L.2.) The report of Detective Palfreyman is 
consistent with that of Detective Cain: 
Det. Cain advised me that she had been given the instructions that if the 
suspect, Russo, came out of the residence again ... that we were to 
detain him for questioning . .... 
At approximately 1150 hours Det. Cain advised me that she saw the 
suspect leave the residence and head towards the mailboxes .... 
Det. Cain and I then made contact with Russo at the mailbox area. He 
was detained and placed into handcuffs. Det. Cain then searched him for 
any weapons. We did not locate any weapons on him.6 
(R., p.139 (emphasis added).) Further, a subsequent affidavit submitted in support of a 
request for a warrant authorizing a search of the phone, which by then had already 
been searched by Det. King, described the incident as follows: 
[A] cellular phone was recovered from Mr. Russo's person during a pat 
down search for officer safety. This phone was opened and looked at to 
determine ownership. Your affiant knows that a video was located on that 
phone that appears to depict the victim from this morning's rape. At that 
point the review of the cell phone's contents was stopped .... Your affiant 
requests permission to search the entirety of the phone. 
6 Det. Palfreyman's report makes no mention of the phone found in Det. Cain's search 
of Mr. Russo's person, or Det. King's search of that phone a few minutes later. 
(R., pp.139-40.) 
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(R., p.154.) Thus, Mr. Russo's arrest would not have followed on the heels of the 
search of his person, but for discovery of the video found on the phone found on his 
person.7 Accordingly, rather than presenting an argument that is consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent, the State seeks to have this Court turn that precedent on its 
head. 
A second flaw in the State's position is that it has not, and indeed cannot, support 
its contention that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a 
home, ipso facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. Initially, it 
is important to note that the State has offered no legal authority in support of its 
argument in this regard. (See Resp. Brief, p.11.) Accordingly, the State has waived this 
argument. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R. 35(b)(6). 
More importantly though, the State's position is not legally supportable. It cannot 
be said that if there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for a home, ipso 
facto, there is probable cause to arrest the resident of that home. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 
444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979) (holding that a search warrant authorizing a search of a 
tavern and the person of the bartender did not establish probable cause to search 
another patron found on the premises); United States v. Oi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585-86 
(1948) (holding that probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception 
does not allow for searches of the individuals riding therein). Indeed, the inquiry of 
whether probable cause exists to conduct a search is not identical to the inquiry of 
whether probable cause exists to arrest. See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282 
7 The district court noted that the search could not be justified as a search incident to 
arrest because the subsequent arrest "was, in part, based on the items obtained at the 
search." (1/27/10 Tr., p.82, Ls.4-6.) 
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(Ct. App. 2005).8 If it were, and if probable cause to search necessarily gave rise to 
probable cause to arrest the homeowner (and search that homeowner incident to 
arrest), in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court would not have had to engage in 
an analysis of whether the homeowner could be temporarily detained while the police 
executed a search warrant at his residence; it simply could have held that, because a 
magistrate had determined that there was probable cause to believe drugs were in 
Summers' home, ipso facto, there was probable cause to arrest him and search him 
incident to arrest. But, of course, that was not the holding of Summers; Summers was 
far more limited. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05 ("If the evidence that a citizen's 
residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an 
invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that 
citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. 
Thus, for Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband 
8 In Gibson, the Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
The standard of probable cause involves the same quantum of 
evidence regardless of whether an arrest or a search is involved. United 
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir.2004). Nonetheless, the 
facts needed to justify a search are different from those needed to justify a 
seizure. Humphries, 372 F.3d at 659. Rather, each conclusion requires a 
showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances. 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.1(b) (3d ed.1996). The right to 
arrest arises when a crime is committed or attempted in the officer's 
presence whereas a search can be authorized when probable cause 
demonstrates that an item connected with criminal activity will be found in 
a certain location. Id. In the case of an arrest, the conclusion concerns the 
guilt of the arrestee. LaFave, supra, at § 3.1 (b). Accordingly, although the 
conclusions that justify a search or seizure must be supported by the 
same degree of integrity, the conclusions themselves are not identical. Id. 
Therefore, the existence of probable cause to search Gibson's vehicle 
does not resolve whether there was probable cause to believe that Gibson 
was guilty of possession of a controlled substance. 
Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282. 
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founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the 
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted."). And, in Summers, the 
Court noted that Summers was arrested (and searched incident to arrest), only after his 
home had been searched pursuant to a properly-executed search warrant and that 
search yielded additional evidence to support a finding of probable cause to arrest 
Summers. See id. at 693 & n.1. 
The third flaw in the State's reasoning relates to the question of whether, given 
the facts of this case, there was actually probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. The State 
claims that "it is undisputed in this case that the officers had, before they detained and 
searched him, established probable cause to believe that Russo had committed several 
rapes." (Resp. Br., p.11 (emphasis added).) As such, the State suggests that 
Mr. Russo has implicitly conceded that there was probable cause to believe he 
committed one or more rapes. The State's statement, however, is misleading, and its 
suggestion is patently false. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo did not challenge the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause to search his residence and, therefore, its issuance of the search 
warrant. However, this decision on Mr. Russo's part is in no way a concession that 
probable cause-either to search or to arrest-existed. A forfeiture of a claim is far 
different than a concession of that claim. Thus, the fact that Mr. Russo has not 
challenged the issuance of the search warrant in no way informs the question of 
whether there was probable cause to arrest him.9 A more accurate assertion from the 
9 There are any number of reasons why an appellate claim may be forfeited, see, e.g., 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (recognizing that appellate counsel may, 
for strategic reasons, properly forego colorable claims on appeal), not the least of which 
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State would have been that it has not yet been disputed on appeal that the officers had 
probable cause to believe that Mr. Russo was a rapist. And, of course, the reason that 
this issue has not yet been disputed on appeal is that the State's current "search 
incident to arrest" argument is a brand new one, raised for the first time on appeal. 
Mr. Russo simply had no reason to argue that probable cause was lacking prior to now. 
Accordingly, the State's suggestion that this appeal can be resolved by reliance on a 
single fact-the fact that a warrant was issued for a search of Mr. Russo's residence-
should be rejected. 
Rejection of the State's argument in this regard ought to end the inquiry, as the 
State has not attempted to argue the facts of the case, or to explain how those facts 
give rise to probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R. 
35(b )(6). However, to the extent that this Court is willing to indulge the State's new 
"search incident to arrest" argument, and is willing to engage in the probable cause 
is that a given claim may be subject to an unfavorable standard of review. Compare 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) ("[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact 
scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo 
review. A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference 
by reviewing courts.' 'A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants,' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant 'courts should not invalidate ... warrant[s] by 
interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.' ... 
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of 
an issuing magistrate's probable cause determination has been that so long as the 
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.") (Citations omitted), 
and State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686 (2004) (applying Gates' "substantial basis" 
standard in reviewing the district court's decision to issue a search warrant), with 
State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449, 451-53 (1989) (reviewing de novo the trial court's 
determination that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant). 
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analysis that the State skipped, Mr. Russo offers the following explanation of why there 
was no probable cause to support an arrest (prior to discovery of the cell phone video). 
When police got the call about J.W.'s rape, they immediately suspected 
Mr. Russo-not because they had any evidence linking him to the crime, but because 
he was their usual suspect. (See R, pp.131-32.) Mr. Russo has a Washington 
conviction for rape (the rape occurred in 1995). (R., pp.129-30.) In addition, he was a 
suspect in a bizarre home invasion in Nampa in August 200S. (See R., pp.127-29.) He 
was not charged in that case though. (R, p.7S; see also R, pp.123-32.) Thereafter, 
based on his prior conviction and the suspicion that he was involved in the Nampa 
home invasion, Mr. Russo was identified as a suspect in a July 2009 rape in Fruitland. 10 
(See R, pp.125-27.) However, he had not been charged in that case either. (R, pp.7S-
79; see also R, pp.123-32.) The fact is that there was no direct evidence actually 
linking Mr. Russo to either the Nampa incident or the Fruitland rape. (See R, pp.125-
31.) Furthermore, the victim of the Nampa incident was shown at least three photo 
lineups and one video lineup which included Mr. Russo, but she never identified him as 
her attacker (R, p.7S), and bystanders who saw the apparent assailant leaving the 
scene of the Nampa incident indicated that Mr. Russo was not the man they saw 
(R, pp.7S, 12S). 
The only new evidence that the police had when J.W. reported her rape in this 
case was that, when the police went to the home of their usual suspect in the early 
morning hours of August 29, 2009, the engine of his motorcycle was "extremely hot," 
10 While the Fruitland rape bore a couple of similarities (as well as a large number of 
dissimilarities) to the rape Mr. Russo committed in Washington in 1995, the Nampa 
incident bore no similarities. (R., pp.12S-32.) 
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indicating that it had recently been ridden, and the lights were on in Mr. Russo's 
residence, indicating that Mr. Russo was awake early that morning. 11 (R., pp.131-32.) 
Mr. Russo submits that merely being the usual suspect, and having apparently been out 
and about on the morning after the rape-with no evidence actually connecting him to 
J.W., her residence (or even her city),12 or the crime-does not constitute probable 
cause to arrest. 13 See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (discussing the 
probable cause standard). A hunch? Definitely. Reasonable articulable suspicion? 
Perhaps. But probable cause? Most certainly not. 14 
4. Because The "Inevitable Discovery" Doctrine Has No Application In This 
Case, The Exclusionary Rule Applies And The District Court Erred In 
Failing To Suppress The Cell Phone Video 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Russo argued that the so-called "inevitable discovery" 
doctrine has no application in this case. (App. Br., pp.20-23.) In presenting this 
11 In its Respondent's Brief, the State suggests that the police had an additional piece of 
evidence connecting Mr. Russo to the rape of J.W. It asserts that "[s]tarting around 
6:00 [on the morning of J.W.'s rape] officers saw Russo making several trips to a 
laundry room near his four-plex apartment where he started doing laundry, including 
clothing matching the description provided by the victim of clothing worn by the rapist." 
(Resp. Br., p.5; see also Resp. Br., p.13.) This suggestion is exceptionally misleading. 
The record reveals only that, before they obtained a warrant to search Mr. Russo's 
residence, officers saw him leave that residence and walk around his building. There is 
no indication that the officers knew he was going to/from a laundry room, and there is 
certainly no indication that the officers saw him carrying clothes fitting the description 
provided by J.W. (See R., pp.145, 153-54 (application for amended search warrant, 
indicating that it was only later that officers learned of the existence of the laundry room, 
and seeking permission an amended warrant that would allow a search of that laundry 
room). 
12 The rape was committed in Nampa, but Mr. Russo lived in Meridian. 
13 Had the evidence concerning the other alleged crimes been sufficient to give rise to 
probable cause, presumably Mr. Russo would have been arrested and charged for 
those crimes. 
14 Mr. Russo's contention that probable cause to arrest did not exist prior to discovery of 
the cell phone video is supported by the State's candid concession below that, without 
the video, it probably could not even take Mr. Russo's case to trial. (R., p.121.) 
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argument, he explained why the State's theory of inevitable discovery-its contention 
that, but for the illegality, the State would have sought, and received, a second or 
amended warrant that would have authorized seizure and search of Mr. Russo's 
phone-is unavailing. (App. Sr., p.22.) He also explained why the district court's theory 
of inevitable discovery-its belief that the original warrant authorized a search of 
Mr. Russo's person, and his phone, even though he was found outside the residence-
was incorrect. (App. Sr., p.23.) 
On appeal, the State again argues the inevitable discovery doctrine, but it does 
so based on a wholly new theory. This time around, the State places no reliance on the 
search warrants; instead, it claims that, even if the original search of Mr. Russo and his 
phone was improper, because it was inevitable that he would have been arrested at 
some point, it is likewise inevitable that his phone would have been seized and 
searched. (Resp. Sr., pp.12-13.) However, the reality is that the police did not have 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Russo when they first arrived, and they did not discover 
sufficient new evidence to give rise to probable cause to arrest him after they searched 
his home and motorcycle. As noted above, all police knew when they arrived at 
Mr. Russo's residence was that he was their usual suspect, and that he had been out 
and about on his motorcycle early that morning. 15 Furthermore, when they executed 
their warrants, they found only two items of interest-neither of which is particularly 
15 The State claims that the evidence showed that "Russo had driven his motorcycle a 
considerable distance before 5:47 a.m. the morning of the rape" (Resp. Sr., p.13); 
however, this is fanciful speculation by the State. The evidence showed simply that the 
motorcycle's engine was "extremely hot." (R., p.132.) There is no evidence in record 
showing how hot "extremely hot" is, and there is certainly no expert testimony in the 
record equating any particular motorcycle engine temperature with any particular 
distance driven. 
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probative. First, the officers found in the laundry room clothing supposedly matching 
that which was worn by J.W.'s assailant. 16 However, the clothing found was far from a 
perfect match to that which was described by J.W. Immediately after she was raped, 
J.W. called 9-1-1 and reported that her attacker had been wearing jean shorts (see 
8/3/10 Tr., p.281, L.23 - p.282, L.1; Ex.1), but the clothes found in Mr. Russo's laundry 
room included full-length jeans, not jean shorts (8/3/10 Tr., p.387, Ls.1-13).17 Second, 
although the police found latex gloves in the saddlebags on Mr. Russo's motorcycle 
(R., p.135)-latex gloves which the State now claims were "similar to those used by the 
rapist" (Resp. Br., p.13)-the fact is that the State has offered no evidence to suggest 
that those latex gloves fit any sort of specific description provided by J.W. (See Ex. 1 
(9-1-1 call indicating that the rapist used "medical" gloves, but failing to otherwise 
16 Officers also found in Mr. Russo's residence a pair of boots which, at trial, it 
attempted to link to a tread print left on J.W.'s balcony. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.371, L.20-
p.372, L.12; Ex. 30.) However, despite what the officers may now claim, the possible 
match of the Mr. Russo's to the marks on the balcony would not have been immediately 
apparent and, thus, Mr. Russo's boots would not have necessarily implicated him. 
Indeed, even after thorough study, the State's expert was never able to link Mr. Russo's 
specific boots to the marks on the balcony. (8/3/10 Tr., p.4l0, L.19 - p.480, L.10.) In 
fact, she conceded that the boots found in Mr. Russo's residence are common, as they 
are available at the Gowen Field Base Exchange, and a lot soldiers deploying out of 
Gowen Field are wearing them. (See 8/3/10 Tr., p.474, L.20 - p.475, L.11.) In addition, 
the type of outsole in question, the "Sierra" produced by Vibram, is not only available on 
boots like those possessed by Mr. Russo and common among Idaho's soldiers, but is 
also used on numerous other brands of shoes or boots, including: Wolverine, Belleville, 
Rocky Shoes, Weinbrenner, Danner, Bule, Brown, McRae, Wellco, Altama, STC, 
Jengrate, Minor, and Son. (8/3/10 Tr., p.475, L.12 - p.476, L.14.) 
17 The evidence discussed in this portion of Mr. Russo's Reply Brief was not before the 
district court when the suppression motion was decided. However, because the State 
never argued inevitable discovery based on an inevitable search incident to arrest 
below and Mr. Russo, therefore, was deprived of an opportunity below to show why that 
argument fails, fundamental fairness, i.e., due process, as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, demands that he be allowed to go outside the evidence that 
was before the district court at the suppression hearing. 
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describe them).) Mr. Russo contends that clothing different from that which was 
described by the victim, and latex gloves that were not shown to be similar to those 
used in the rape, were not probative of his guilt and, therefore, even when coupled with 
the officers' hunch (arising out of the fact that Mr. Russo was their usual suspect and 
had obviously driven his motorcycle early that morning), did not give them probable 
cause to arrest Mr. Russo. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71. Further, even if this Court 
could, in hindsight, say that probable cause existed, that does not mean that Mr. Russo 
would have inevitably been arrested at that time. As noted above, the State has 
recognized that without the video, it does not have a case against Mr. Russo (see 
R., p.121), so it is reasonable to infer that without the video, the State never would have 
had sufficient confidence in its case to arrest Mr. Russo. 
II. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer Irrelevant, Highly Prejudicial 
Evidence And Argument Concerning Mr. Russo's Deviant Sexual Interests 
Mr. Russo contends that the district court erred in allowing the State to present 
evidence that he had sexual fantasies involving rape, and that he possessed 
pornography depicting simulated rape. (App. Sr., pp.23-29.) He argues that such 
evidence was relevant only to his character and/or his sexual deviancy and, therefore, 
was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). (App. Sr., pp.26-27.) Alternatively, he asserts 
that, even if fantasy/pornography evidence was relevant to some proper purpose (such 
as motive, intent, plan, etc.), it was so prejudicial that the prejudice substantially 
outweighed its marginal probative value. (App. Sr., pp.27-29.) 
In response, the State offers two reasons why it believes the 
fantasy/pornography evidence is relevant to a proper purpose. First, it argues that, 
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under State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818 (Ct. App. 2009), the evidence was relevant to 
prove intent, motive, and a plan. (See Resp. Br., p.16.) Second, based on Rossignol 
and two out-of-state cases (State v. Brown, 710 S.E.2d 265 (N.C. App. 2011), and 
People v. Pelo, 942 N.E.2d 463 (III. App. 4th Dist. 2010», the State contends that the 
fantasy/pornography evidence is relevant to show "intent and motive and, by extension, 
identity." (Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) In the alternative, the State also asserts that, to the 
extent that admission of the fantasy/pornography evidence was error, that error was 
harmless. (Resp. Br., p.19 nA.) 
None of the State's arguments have merit. Initially, with regard to the State's 
reliance on Rossignol and its contention that the fantasy/pornography evidence 
demonstrates intent, motive, or plan, little response is necessary. This issue was 
squarely addressed (and thoroughly refuted) in Mr. Russo's opening brief. (See App. 
Br., p.26.) 
The State's "identity" argument, however, does deserve a brief discussion. In 
making its "identity" argument, the State reasons as follows: 
Someone who views depictions of rape for entertainment and 
titillation and who fantasizes about committing rape is more likely to be a 
rapist than someone who finds those acts repulsive. Given the narrow 
scope of the evidence (limited to evidence concerning fantasies of sexual 
violence against women and pornography depicting vaginal and oral rape) 
and how that evidence matched the facts of this case, the evidence 
established motive, intent, and identity. 
[S]omeone who fantasizes and seeks entertainment from 
depictions of rape is more likely to gain (by 'sating his sexual urges') by 
committing a rape than someone who at no time contemplates such an act 
and would gain no such satisfaction from it. Indeed, whoever committed 
the rape generally 'emulated' the 'acts and scenarios' contained in 
Russo's fantasies and entertainment. ... 
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· . .. That Russo spent time fantasizing about rape and seeking 
depictions of it for entertainment demonstrates that his more likely the 
rapist. 
(Resp. Br., pp.17-19.) Essentially, the State's argument is that if Mr. Russo is the kind 
of sexual deviant who is aroused by the idea of rape, chances are good that he acted in 
conformity with his sexual deviancy in this case. In other words, the State is arguing 
propensity and character-the very thing that Rule 404(b) prohibits. 
Finally, the State offers an alternative claim that, even if the fantasy/pornography 
evidence was improperly admitted, its admission was harmless. (Resp. Br., p.19 n.4.) 
However, the sum total of the State's contention in this regard is as follows: "The state 
also asserts that the claimed error is necessarily harmless given the overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, which included evidence that Russo had the video of the rape on his 
cell phone. I.C.R. 52; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 
(2007)." (Resp. Br., p.19 n.4.) There are multiple flaws with this claim though. First, 
because the State has failed to support its contention with any real argument, it ought 
not to be considered by this Court. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263; I.A.R. 35(b)(6); see also 
Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471 (declining to address the question of whether an error found was 
harmless because the State failed to present argument on this point). 
Second, in evaluating the question of whether an error is harmless, the question 
is not whether the remainder of the State's evidence is "overwhelming," as the State 
suggests. The applicable standard is that which was articulated in Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)-whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010) (making it clear that evidentiary errors, not just constitutional errors, are subject 
to the Chapman harmless error test). And, under this standard, "[t]he inquiry ... is not 
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whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). In this 
case, it cannot be found beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was not 
attributable to the highly prejudicial, extraordinarily inflammatory fact that Mr. Russo has 
had rape fantasies and has possessed pornography depicting simulations of rape. 
Third, even if the standard for judging harmlessness was an "overwhelming 
evidence" test, the fact is that the evidence in this case is not overwhelming. As the 
State has indicated, the critical piece of evidence-the evidence without which the State 
concedes it could not even have proceeded to trial-is the video found on Mr. Russo's 
phone. (See R., p.121.) However, as is discussed in the foregoing Statement of Facts, 
it is far from certain that the female in the video is actually the victim in this case, J.W. 
In this case, the jury, based on its review of the video, and its comparison of that video 
to the images of J.W.'s pubic area, could have easily entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the female in the video was, in fact, J.W., but been persuaded that Mr. Russo was 
guilty because of the State's evidence of his deviant sexual interests. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court orders denying 
suppression of the cell phone video and admitting evidence of his sexual fantasies and 
pornography; that it vacate his convictions and sentences; and that it remand his case 
for a new trial. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2012. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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